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Book Reviews
Is International Law a European Conspiracy?
Asked by the International Community Law Review to read and comment on B.S.
Chimni's "Third World Approaches to International Law,"' I was struck by how
similar Chimni's critique of modern international law is to a criticism of interna-
tional law that might be made by an American or Chinese or Russian realist. At
first, I thought, more or less: "poor old international law - yet another 19th cen-
tury liberal construct attacked both by left and by right." But, on reflection,
deciding to evaluate such critiques on their own terms, I concluded that interna-
tional law does seem too often to offer too much community and too little sover-
eignty both to left-leaning "weak" states of the Third World and to right-leaning
"strong" states of the bigger powers, the United States, China, and Russia. This
seems to leave the "middling" states, especially many European states, in between.
For many Europeans, international law as it is may seem just about right. So per-
haps both Dr. Chimni and the realists have a point - international law is, in a
way, a European conspiracy, a movement of the middle against the weak t la
Dr. Chimni, and the strong h la the realists. If so, perhaps the task of transforming
international law is on the shoulders of the Europeans. Can they remodel the
discipline so as to attract weak and strong states, as well as their own?
Let me use Dr. Chimni's essay as my template. It appears that by "third world,"
a term he uses well over a hundred times, he means those countries that were once
the colonies of the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th century European imperial pow-
ers: Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Germany, and Italy. Of course, the present territory of the United States was, for
almost two centuries made up of what were European colonies - British, Dutch,
French, Spanish, Russian, and Swedish. China, too, was partially colonized in the
19th and 20th centuries, especially by the Japanese, Russians, and British. Only
Russia of the nowadays strong states was, more or less, free of colonization, and
indeed, itself an imperial power both on its European and on its Asian frontiers.
On behalf of the "third world," Dr. Chimni launches eleven criticisms against
modern international law. Most of his critiques seem to be shared by strong state
realists. Let me look at Dr. Chimni's critiques in turn.
1) B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, The Third World and Inter-
national Order: Law, Politics And Globalization, pp. 47-73, ed. by A. Anghie, B. Chimni, K. Mickelson
and 0. Okafor (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).
Q Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10. 1163/187197407X231271
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First, Dr. Chimni objects that "international law is now in the process of creat-
ing and defining the 'democratic State."' 2 He considers this a sham meant to
facilitate the transfer "through 'voluntary' undertaken obligatory, national sover-
eign economic space (pertaining to the fields of investment, trade, technology,
currency, environment, etc.) to international institutions that enforce the relevant
rules."'3 This seems to be much the same criticism made by realists who wish to
keep economic decisions within national government control.
Second, Dr. Chimni attacks international law because it "now aspires to directly
regulate property rights [to achieve] the internationalization ofproperty rights."4
This critique would not be entirely shared by some realists who might support the
protection of private property no matter where located.
Third, he critiques international law because it "inter alia lays down rules with
regard to the sales of goods, market access, government procurement, subsidies,
and dumping."5 Here realists would join him part-way, glad to see international
trade facilitated but unwilling to cede national economic sovereignty.
Fourth, Dr. Chimni attacks the fact that "international law increasingly requires
the 'deterritoralization of currencies' subjecting the idea of a 'national currency' to
growing pressure."6 Here realist voices would rise to support his proposition, all
keen to maintain national currency control.
Fifth, Dr. Chimni laments "the internationalization of the discourse of human
rights.."7 This internationality of human rights has led, in his opinion, to unwanted
international interference in internal control of human rights discourse. Such a
lament is, of course, shared by strong state realists.
Sixth, he complains that "labor market deregulation prescribed by interna-
tional financial institutions and international monetary law has caused the dete-
rioration of the living conditions of third world labor."8 This is not a realist
complaint.
Seventh, Dr. Chimni objects to the tendency of international jurisdiction to
make "a hash of geopolitical boundaries," giving as an example the prosecution of
the Pinochet case.9 This objection would be happily accepted by realists, con-
cerned as they are to insulate their national legal processes from outside
influence.
Eighth, Dr. Chimni objects to the "proliferation of international tribunals that
subordinate the role of national legal systems in resolving disputes."' Interna-
2) Id. at 52.
3) Id. at 53.
4) Ibid.
5) Id. at 54-55.
6) Id. at 55.
7) Ibid.
') Id. at 56.
9) Id. at 57.
10) Ibid.
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tional tribunals, like the International Criminal Court are, as is well-known, dis-
trusted by U.S. realists. And, in more than 80 years, neither Russia nor China has
ever submitted a case to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or
its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Ninth, he regrets that "the State is no longer the exclusive participant in
the international legal process," citing especially the use of a lex mercatoria.1"
Given the antiquity of the lex mercatoria, this is a curious objection, unless it is
simply an elaboration of the third objection about common economic rules or
the seventh objection about the globalized jurisdiction making a "hash" of global
boundaries.
Tenth, Dr. Chimni rejects international law's "refusal to affirmatively
differentiate between States at different stages of the development process...
There is no longer space for recognizing the concerns of States and peoples
subjected to long colonial rule."'12 This would be rejected by US and Russian
realists, though the Chinese government might embrace that aspect of the objec-
tion that would support lower environmental standards for developing countries
for the U.N.
Eleventh, he objects to "the privatization of the United Nations system," by
which he means corporate, rather than state financial support of the U.N." 13 It is
doubtful that realists would want to see private, rather than state support of the
United Nations.
For the most part, then, Dr. Chimni's critique of modern international law
is in tune with the melodies of US, Russian, and Chinese realists. They all share
at least eight of Dr. Chimni's objections to modern international law: interna-
tional law interferes with national sovereignty in the name of democracy; it inter-
feres with national sovereignty to achieve international economic control; it
interferes with national sovereignty to allow international control of currencies; it
interferes with national sovereignty to promote human rights; it interferes with
national sovereignty by making a jurisdictional hash out of domestic legal sys-
tems; it interferes with national sovereignty by giving power to international
tribunals; it interferes with national sovereignty by denying states the right to be
the exclusive participant in international legal process; and it interferes with
national sovereignty by privatizing the United Nations. Only with respect to
three issues - the international protection of private property, the effect of inter-
national markets on labor relations, and the failure to accord special economic
treatment to third world states - does it seem that Dr. Chimni and the strong
state realists might disagree in opposing modern liberal international law.
11) Id. at 58.
2) Id. at 59.
13) Id. at 59.
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Though Dr. Chimni and the realists may agree, by and large, on their opposi-
tion to modern international law, they probably do so for different reasons.
Dr. Chimni feels that international law is too strong for the weak. The realists
believe that international law is too strong for the strong. This leaves many Euro-
peans as international law's best friends. There are also those in the third world,
who Dr. Chimni chides as "the ruling elite," who are becoming "an integral part
of an emerging transnational ruling elite that seeks to establish the global rule of
transnational capital on the pretext of pursing 'national interests"'' 4 and those in
the United States, Russia, and China whom the neo-conservatives similarly see as
betraying national interests for international community values.
So, is international law really a European conspiracy with some hangers on in
the Third World and the big powers? Are Dr. Chimni, U.S., Russian, and Chinese
realists right, for their own reasons, that those in the Third World and those in the
United States, Russia, and China who promote international law are actually
tools of some sort of a European conspiracy, who might be a threat to national
sovereign interests?
Plainly, it is easier for one to be "for" international law, if one comes from one
of the many middling European states whether largish - Britain, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain - or smallish - The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Switzerland, Portugal, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. In all these states, there seems
to be a natural coincidence of the virtues of international law with national
interests. There can be economic or strategic differences, but in many cases the
typical European state and its nationals stand to benefit from a stable world econ-
omy and polity, where community interests sometimes prevail over national
interests.
How different is the situation in either the weak states promoted by Dr. Chimni
or in the strong states promoted by the realists? As Dr. Chimni and the strong state
realists argue, often times more will be lost than gained in any trade off between
the values of the international community and the sovereign interests of national
states. International law may well be less advantageous to both weak states and
strong states than to middling states.
Dr. Chimni has written a "manifesto" urging weak states to be firm in making
tough demands on international law. Of course, he may be right for weak states,
but his manifesto may be just as right for strong states. Ought Dr. Chimni's
manifesto spur the middling states, and especially European international law-
yers, to recognize such challenges from left and right? Sometimes, there may be
too much outrage from the Europeans about any opposition to international law
and too little accommodation. International law may need to put its best foot
forward and the logical place for that step to begin is from international law's
14) Id. at 51.
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natural allies, the Europeans. Perhaps a little more European conspiracy for inter-
national law would be a good thing.
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